The context
REITs / listed real estate delivered decent performance in the first half of 2026. Total returns for the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate Index were 9.4%, slightly lagging the S&P 500 total return of 10.2%.
The Long Pond real estate ETF ($LPRE), which I track as a decent benchmark for my real estate focused investments delivered 14.1% returns in H1 2026.
Closed / Exited Ideas
Veris Residential
Write up price: $14.70 (July 2025).
Close price: $19.00 per share (May 27, 2026), $0.24 of distributions paid
Total return: 31%
Annualized return: 37% / IRR: 38%
Last update. Taken private by Affinius Capital and Vista Hill Partners at $19 per share. This was ~5% lower than my net liquidation value estimate at the time of my original write-up of ~$20 per share. I think my valuation of the operating portfolio was pretty much right on but I had been too optimistic about the value of their last remaining waterfront development site, which I had thought could be worth $85m - $115m and sold for $75m.
FrontView REIT (and investment update HERE)
Write up price: $11.50 per share (April 2025).
Close price: $19.60 per share (June 9, 2026), $0.86 of distributions paid
Total return: 78%
Annualized return: 66% / IRR: 65%
Update with decision to trim here; latest update here. This is a significant trim rather than a full exit. I plan to continue to write brief updates on the company until I fully exit, but the original thesis has played out, the company is no longer deeply discounted, and I expect more normal net lease REIT type returns from here of 6% - 8% per year.
Basically everything went right with this one. As I had hypothesized, the tenant issues they faced following their IPO were an aberration and they’ve had no significant issues since. The Co-CEO exiting for personal issues (that I still haven’t gotten to the bottom of) led to a great new CFO coming in who’s helped make this small net lease REIT one of the best in the sector in terms of transparency and disclosures. If anything, I think their portfolio quality has proven to be significantly better than I had initially thought based on the pricing of their dispositions and ability to re-tenant properties at higher rents.
The preferred deal with Maewyn looks expensive in hindsight (and will be a home run for them and their investors) but it provided the stability required for the company to provide guidance and execute, which has earned them an improved cost of capital. The net lease virtuous cycle / flywheel has started to turn as they have started to issue equity at a cost of capital lower than their acquisition cap rates and driving earnings per share growth through acquisitions.
Their small size is a differentiator within the net lease peer set as they are able to grow earnings per share faster than competitors on lower investment volume. They are now in-line with other leading net lease REITs such as EPRT 0.00%↑ and ADC 0.00%↑ for AFFO growth in 2026 and it’s not out of the question that they could earn an even higher AFFO multiple as strong growth continues into 2027. But a lot of that growth is priced into the stock after its strong gains over the past 5 quarters or so.
Active Ideas
abrdn European Logistics Income
Write up price: £0.57 per share (Jan 2025).
Close price: £0.19 per share (June 30, 2026), £0.48 of distributions paid to-date
Total return: 19%
Annualized return: 13% / IRR: 21%
Latest update. This liquidation is down to one property in the Netherlands. They missed the pre-summer-holidays-in-Europe window to sell that asset so I would assume this gets done in Q4. If it doesn’t, there’s a bigger issue at play, which would be a signal to reassess. Discount to net liquidation getting pretty slim although I have built in some additional buffer for liquidation costs / leakage, which I hope prove conservative. I probably could and should have traded this more actively / closed it out earlier.
Net Lease Office Properties
Write up price: $30.75 per share (May 2025).
Close price: $11.13 per share (June 30, 2026), $22.35 of distributions paid to-date
Total return: 9%
Annualized return: 8% / IRR: 11%
Latest update here. Following a flurry of sales including KBR Tower and Google early in the year, it’s been mostly slow going over at NLOP. KBR Tower in Houston is where I talked myself into an overly optimistic outcome and the eventual sale price underperformed even my downside case estimates. Apart from that, the thesis has pretty much held up and so far the investment has delivered an OK return despite underperforming my original targets.
I see net liquidation value at $13.45 per share. This now incorporates $10m (~$0.70 per share) of REIT wind-down costs, which I probably should have incorporated from the outset to be conservative. This does not include the management termination fee and my estimates of selling costs for the remaining properties, which total another $10m / ~$0.70 per share.
A couple of properties represent the lion’s share of remaining value. I estimate that just 3 of the 18 remaining properties - Omnicom, the University of Iowa support services building, and iHearCommunications in San Antonio with ~8.5yrs remaining are about 50%. So these are the sales to watch as they will really move the needle. I think it’s worth holding given the spread but I am not inclined to add to the position unless we see sales that really outperform my estimates.
Logistea AB
Write up price: SEK 14.50 (June 2025).
Close price: SEK 13.32 per share (June 30, 2026), SEK 0.10 of distributions paid to-date
Total return: -7%
Annualized return: -7% / IRR: -7%
Latest update here. I think this is an interesting one as the performance of the stock has been disappointing since my investing journal write-up despite performance of the business being… fine? This was a position I entered when it was deeply discounted, had to do a highly dilutive equity raise so I have a cost basis of ~SEK 7.00 per share. However, performance since I wrote it up over a year ago has been poor and its been a loser for the portfolio since my investing journal write-up.
Revisiting my original thesis, I think I was broadly right. The company has been able to grow earnings per share by almost 20% (profit from property management or PFPM is the Swedish PropCo term), largely through accretive external acquisitions. They’ve maintained high occupancy and signed significant new leases. They have progressed potential development projects for industrial (and dare I say it, even data center uses) that they have under option. They have been able to manage their balance sheet effectively, tightening spreads on their bank debt. They’ve simplified the equity capital structure by eliminating their dual share classes and super-voting A shares.
What I got very wrong was that the market would appreciate this playing out and reward the company with a higher share price!
Operating performance combined with the decline in the share price means that they now trade at a ~7.7% cap rate / 10% PFPM yield vs. a 6.5% cap rate / 7% PFPM yield at the time of my original write-up. This has largely been a Logistea issue - the company trades at a 160 bps cap rate spread and 200 bp PFPM yield spread to peers, an increase from 120 bps cap rate and 100 bps PFPM yield spreads at the time of my write up.
I am OK with letting this play out. Depending on capital available I am considering adding to this position as it feels too cheap.
BSR REIT
Write up price: $13.30 (July 2025).
Close price: $11.70 per share (June 30, 2026), $0.51 of distributions paid to-date
Total return: -8%
Annualized return: -8% / IRR: -8%
Latest update here. Jury is still out whether this thesis was too early or just plain wrong. Being early in a sub-scale, highly leveraged name is painful - especially if when fundamentals have yet to bottom - as operating and financial leverage cuts against you. That has been the case here so far.
There was a chance that the 2026 leasing season was going to show real recover in BSR’s Texas markets but that hasn’t yet fully materialized. There are green shoots - occupancy has begun to rebuild and blended lease rates were positive in Q2 - but new leases remain negative. I also felt there was a chance that M&A interest would be galvanized by the AvalonBay transaction that eliminated the consent rights provided to the legacy, Class B unitholders. This also hasn’t been the case.
I continue to believe that there are multiple ways to win with BSR: they have implemented tried-and-true operating initiatives copied from larger peers (bulk internet, valet trash, podding property management) to drive FFO per share, if and when fundamentals turn positive, it will support a re-rate in the stock, and they do have a fairly young, predominantly garden-style and midrise suburban multifamily portfolio that’s 60% in Dallas and Austin, target metro areas for REIT and PE peers, which could support M&A.
ELME
Write up price: $2.15 (March 2026).
Close price: $1.48 per share (June 30, 2026)
Total return: -31%
Annualized return: -96% / IRR: -68%
Latest update here. This is an example of when life comes at you fast in REIT liquidations. I wrote this up in March with a $2.50 per share net liquidation value target. Over the next couple of months things were looking OK - pricing was on the weak side of my estimates, lowering my liquidation value estimate to $2.29 per share (update here) with the shares trading down to around $2.00 per share.
Then they dropped a bomb of a liquidation update in late June in which they announced that their largest property, Riverside Apartments in Alexandria, VA had fallen out of contract with the buyer and retracted their estimate for liquidation distributions.
I wrote an update on June 25th incorporating that information here. At that point, the stock traded at $1.55 (it would trade down to $1.35 later that day and remain below $1.50 per share for the next several days). This was a key decision point for me. One part of me, especially in that moment, wanted to sell out and wash my hands of the situation. However, due in part to having done a good amount of work on the underlying assets - and appreciating just how cheaply they were getting valued on an implied basis - and in larger part to being able to compare notes with a couple of other, well-informed and experienced investors who knew the name well I instead doubled down.
The jury is still out whether this was the right call but things have been moving in the right direction. My initial $2.50 per share liquidation estimate is long gone and I am virtually certain to lose money on my initial cost basis. However, the company did succeed in getting Riverside back under contract and reinstated their estimate of liquidating distributions with a range of $1.74 - $1.94 per share. Net assets in liquidation at Q2 were $1.89 per share. This position could break even or even generate a small return on my average cost basis.
ILPT
Write up price: $9.00 (June 2026).
Close price: $8.87 per share (June 30, 2026)
Total return: -1%
Annualized return: -35% / IRR: -30%
I only published this thesis 2 weeks before the performance reporting date so returns are not particularly relevant at this point. However, I’m pleased to see a bunch of the pieces of the thesis fall into place, which are covered in my Q2 2026 earnings update here.
Strong leasing, and leasing up their two major vacancies ahead of schedule, has allowed they to increase FFO per share guidance. They also doubled their dividend to an annual rate of $0.40 per share. This continues to reflect a low payout ratio of 30% of 2026 FFO guidance. I think they will continue to raise the dividend 1-2 more times towards a more normalized 60% - 80% payout ratio on FFO over the remainder of 2026 and in 2027, which I hope will drive a re-rating of the stock.
The Brookfield & CPPIB take-private of LXP Industrial, which I covered in an update here, provides a useful transaction comparable to support the real estate value of ILPT’s not too dissimilar mainland portfolio of net lease bulk distribution warehouses. I see this deal representing a ~5.7% cap rate and $90 PSF versus my NAV estimate for ILPT’s mainland portfolio at a 7.0% cap rate, which represents $85 PSF.
I don’t rely on NAV to justify my price target for ILPT - RMR is extremely unlikely to let a transaction take this big chunk of fee-earning AUM out of their orbit, even at a great price by a buyer who meets their punitive management termination fee terms - but its a useful touchpoint on the value of the business.